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Abstract
This investigation considers the impact of the concept of luck on coaching
retention in the National Football League (NFL). The head coach of an NFL team is often
under intense scrutiny to perform in a high profile position. Due to a small inventory of
games each season, there is the potential for luck to influence whether or not a season is
viewed a success. This study seeks to measure the impact of luck for a given NFL team
while attempting to correlate with the retention or release of the head coach.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Sport is often considered big business at the highest levels (Frederick, 2013). Similar
to the management of any other high profile business, sport management is highly visible
and quite public often leading to public debate and scrutiny of management decisions. In
a high visibility environment, it can be difficult to deviate from accepted logic. Going
against commonly held beliefs could result in a loss of support from fans and sponsors.
Winning may gain back some of that support, but if luck is a significant contributing
factor the right decision may still yield negative results. The potential for the correct
decision to yield negative results makes any thinking outside of the norm both a potential
break through and a potential disaster for a sport management team.
One of the most high profile decisions a management team in the National
Football League (NFL) must make is whether or not to fire a head coach. There are any
number of factors, both quantitative and qualitative, to consider when making such a
decision. A coach’s job performance could be measured in many different ways across
many different areas. Some of these areas may include whether the team is performing
well on the field (Holmes, 2010), whether the fans and sponsors support the coach, or
whether the management team believes the coach has the ability to do the job (Mason,
2014). All of these factors may be considered when determining coach retention. One
factor that may be overlooked by some is the concept of luck.

1.2 Purpose of the study
The purpose of this study is to investigate the luck factor and its impact on the
decision to retain NFL head coaches. With the rise of advanced analytics, there is likely
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more information for a management team to consider now than ever before when making
such a decision. While this could make determining how a coach is performing easier, if
there is a significant factor in a coach’s performance that is not considered, management
teams could be operating under less than ideal conditions. It is the aim of this study to
determine if the impact of luck on an NFL team could determine the employment fate of
the head coaches.

1.2.1 Research Objectives
1) To gain an understanding of the impact of luck on an NFL team’s outcomes
during a given season.
2) To determine how much, if any, effect the impact of luck has on NFL head

coach’s retention.

1.3 Defining Luck
In order to determine if luck is a significant contributing factor, it is necessary to
assign it an operational definition. Michael Mauboussin, Chief Investment Strategist at
Legg Mason Capital Management, describes luck possessing having three features:
1) The first is that it occurs to both groups and individuals.
2) Second, the effect can be good or bad.
3) Third, luck may play a role when it is reasonable to believe that something else
may have happened (Arbesman, 2012).
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If you've watched sport on television you likely have heard it said of a team that
just lost, “If they played that game ten more times, they would win nine” (Bishop, 2009).
While that colloquialism is hardly scientific, there are plenty of examples of one team
statistically defeating another team, while losing the contest. If these aberrant results
happen to cluster together, a team's win-loss record for a stretch of games may not reflect
the true performance of the team. This sort of variation tends to even out over time.
However, until it does, it has the effect of either good or bad luck, depending on which
way the variation goes. If a management team happens to make a decision based on data
sets with small sample sizes and the data set has been skewed due to this luck factor, the
decision could cause people to lose their jobs erroneously. This suggests that, for the
purposes of this study, luck and variation are closely intertwined. Thus, they will be
treated the same.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Coaching
One of the most visible decisions a management team has to make is the decision
to retain or fire a head coach (Frederick, 2013). In this decision making process the
performance of the coach must be weighed against the likely performance of the
replacement. While it is easy for a team that is not winning to consider making a change
at the top, some research suggests changing coaches results in worse performance than
keeping the incumbent. This is likely due to the turnover in personnel and change in
strategy accompanying a new coach (Adler, Berry & Doherty, 2013). While a change in
approach may be attractive to a management team when their team is not winning, it also
tends to interrupt the development of an organization. Deciding on whether or not a
change of approach is necessary is complicated, and therefore, the team's performance
alone may not be an adequate metric for coach dismissal.
While a team's performance alone may not be enough to dismiss a coach, every
situation is different (Adler, Berry & Doherty, 2012). Even in professional football,
where there is a salary cap and a competitive framework encouraging parity, each
management team will value some aspects of performance over others (Deceuster &
Kishor, 2012). This complex situation is difficult enough to navigate without any luck at
all involved. If luck is a significant factor, it adds another layer of complexity. Despite
the complexity of probability factors and luck, there are simple ways to evaluate it.
These ways may over-simplify a situation, but can be a starting point to launch a broader
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discussion. Rating a coach’s performance could be as simple as measuring wins and
losses against what is expected by the organization (Adler, Berry & Doherty, 2012).
While some teams may only be expected to win more than lose, others may be expected
to win championships. A coach’s true performance level cannot be entirely measured by
winning percentage. Before the rise of advanced metrics, management teams had to make
judgment calls about player talent and the effect of injuries. Based on their opinions of
those and other metrics, they could then judge the performance of the coach. In more
recent times, researchers such as Brian Burke have used win probability formulas to
estimate how a coach’s decision making effected the number of wins and losses his team
recorded (Meiselman, 2012). These measures vary widely in results and what they
attempt to measure. This suggests that a complete and accurate predictor of good
coaching has not yet been found. One of the major difficulties in measuring predictors of
successful coaching is accurately gauging player talent (Dawson, Dobson & Gerrard,
2000). Certain players will thrive in certain systems while floundering in others making
it difficult to determine whether a team’s struggles are due to a coaching deficiency or
some other variables.
The question of player quality is another layer of complexity that must be
addressed. The acquisition and retention of players also brings the politics of a
management team into play. In the NFL, the control over personnel decisions is often
shared by many different people and varies from team to team (Breer, 2013). When a
head coach has little involvement in personnel decisions, it would be reasonable to
believe the persons involved in organizational personnel may share some of the blame
when a team fails. While that may well be the case, that person has a vested interest in
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directing blame towards a coaching staff, and away from the players, as his own job may
be at stake if he does not. This power struggle could have an impact on the decision
making process, which is difficult to quantify. What is clear is that each situation is
different and understanding who holds the power over what is important in evaluating
performance (Breer, 2013). Taking an analytical approach and looking purely at the hard
numbers allows us to discern which variables have the greatest impact, but we should not
ignore that there is always more to the story that numbers have a hard time capturing
(Williams, 2015).
There is much more literature available on the effect of coaching changes at the
collegiate level than there is on the effect in the NFL. Maxcy (2013) suggested the sport
of football may differ from the accepted logic of the marketplace considering favoring
retention. In that study it was found that the replacement of coaches whose teams were
not performing was usually a good decision. With college football having far less parity
than any professional sport and the NFL having more parity than the other major
professional leagues it would be reasonable to expect changes to have a greater impact in
the NFL (Deceuster & Kishor, 2012). Add to that the existence of a salary cap in the NFL
ensures that the difference in talent from team to team is much less than in college
football and the importance of a good coach becomes evident. Therefore, if the trend
holds from college football to the professional ranks, it would be even more important for
NFL teams to make a change when their teams aren't performing.
The above discussion suggests why the effect of coaching in the NFL may be
magnified compared to lower levels of the game. If that is the case, finding a measure of
how effective a particular coach is would be a valuable tool. Hadley et al. (2000),
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developed such a measure and found the mean efficiency rate of NFL head coaches to be
.641. This is a coaching efficiency percentage. Thus, if a perfect coach would be able to
produce 10 wins over the course of a 16 game NFL season with a given roster, the
average head coach would only be able to produce 6.41 wins in the same situation.
While a perfect coach likely does not exist, this is a dramatic difference considering 10
wins usually qualifies a team for the play-offs while 6 or 7 wins is a losing season. When
you also consider that there are below average coaches out there you find that some
teams may have no chance at a successful season regardless of talent. The Hadley study
looked at statistics that encompass on field performance in each phase of the game and
used those to predict the number of wins a team should have had.
While some might suggest that head coaches also have a significant impact on
player statistics, such as those used in the Hadley study to predict the number of wins a
team should have had, other research does not find that to be the case. When using
somewhat simplistic measures to measure coaching ability, years of experience or winloss record, coaching does not appear to have a significant impact on player’s statistics
(Berri & Schmidt, 2006). This finding, in addition to the rather impressive list of names
that Hadley found to have the highest coaching efficiency ratings, suggests that head
coaches have a great deal of impact on the number of wins a team achieves, even if their
impact on individual player’s statistics is negligible. That one coach could achieve
drastically different results given the same level of player talent would lend credence to
those who call for the head coaches firing when their team isn't winning games.
Despite the suggestion that coaches have a great deal of impact on the
performance of their team, there are many factors that remain outside a coaches' control.
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While the head coach has long been held accountable for the performance of his team, his
players have a great deal of impact on that performance. Kahn (2006) found that the
effectiveness of a coach is based on the quality of his players. In the NFL, it is rare for a
head coach to have complete control over the players on his team (Breer 2013). When
that is the case, it may impact the evaluation of the coach’s performance. Management
could evaluate the quality of players a coach has to work with and take that into account
when evaluating whether a coach is performing adequately.
There needs to be further examination of the relationship between good coaches
and player performance. Proving how much of a team's on-field success is due to the
players and how much is due to the coaches is, obviously, an extremely difficult task, but
doing so would give management teams a huge advantage in making personnel decisions
(Dawson & Gerrard, 2000). Knowing when a team has the right coach, but the wrong
players, or the wrong coach, but the right players, would eliminate the potential to replace
the wrong people. Replacing the wrong people, in that situation, could be devastating to
a franchise. Making the right call should be the focus of every management team looking
to improve their squad. Until data analysis researchers can figure this problem out,
management teams will still have to rely on their knowledge and experience to,
hopefully, get it right.
There are a number of examples of coaches that failed in one situation only to
go on and succeed in another. Bill Belichick had a career record below .500 in the NFL
when the Patriots hired him in 2000 (“Bill Belichick”, 2015, p. 1). He has gone on to be
one of the most successful coaches in NFL history. The quality of players may be to
blame, but there is another possibility. Porter and Scully (1982) suggest that baseball
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managers are more successful as they gain experience. This learning curve based theory
makes sense when applied to any job where experience factors into performance. If
management teams understand this concept, then they will inherently expect less from a
new head coach. This would obviously apply to a new head coach with no prior
experience, but it should also apply to any new head coach taking over a team with which
he is unfamiliar (Porter & Scully, 1982). Because this involves learning about his new
players, becoming familiar with a new situation, and may involve building a new
coaching staff, a learning curve exists regardless of prior experience levels. In football,
this could be even more pronounced than in baseball. New head coaches may implement
an entirely different offensive and defensive scheme which complicates getting to know
new players and may necessitate a higher rate of personnel turnover than usual.
This grace period early in a coach's tenure, to both learn and shape his team,
should not be extrapolated to mean that a coach will continue to improve throughout his
tenure. While he will continue to gain experience, the law of diminishing returns could
apply here (Porter & Scully, 1982). In addition, once his personnel are in place and he
has a team playing as he likes, the coaches' upward trend in performance should flatten
substantially. This effect may be compounded if, as is the case with many successful
teams, key assistant coaches are hired away by other teams. Add to that the potential for
becoming stale, both with players and approach to the game, and coaching performance
could even regress. The argument to allow a coach time to grow should not be
interpreted as an argument to retain a coach indefinitely.
The idea that new head coaches need to be given time to adapt can also be
reversed. Management teams also need time to adjust to the new head coach and to
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evaluate his performance (Scully, 1994; Kahn, 2006). The management team that hired
the new coach will inherently believe that he can be successful so it makes sense that they
would give him time to develop while they build their opinions of his performance. As
head coaches turnover, so do management teams. A change in management teams may
negate this grace period or extend it depending on the new team's attitude towards the
coach.
All of these things could apply to any franchise that hires a new head coach. In
addition, the same line of thinking may help to explain why some coaches keep getting
opportunities even after several failed tenures with various teams. Because the
evaluation of a coach’s performance is such a difficult task, there is almost always an
argument that prior failures had more to do with factors beyond his control than his own
problems (Mihoces, 2015). That, in addition to the possibility that coaches may improve
with experience as discussed in regard to the learning curve theory, may lead teams to
give failed coaches second, third, or even fourth chances. If luck is a significant factor in
some coaches getting fired, that would bolster the argument that these failed coaches
could still be worth the risk.
The effects of a coach on a team's performance, the effects of a coaching change,
and how to evaluate a coaches' performance have all been well studied, both in the
academic world and in less rigorous environments. Such extensive study of this
particular decision suggests that many people see it as an important one. In addition, this
research has established that the decision whether to fire a coach or not is a complex one.
With so many variables to consider, many of them difficult to quantify, the possibility that
luck is a significant factor in ultimately determining whether a coach keeps his job must
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be considered.

2.2 Pythagorean Win Expectation
In 1977 Bill James published Baseball Abstract. In that publication, James introduced
several statistics that he had designed himself to further data analysis focused on baseball.
One of the statistics he introduced was the Pythagorean Win Expectation (PWE) formula
(Luo, 2014, p. 5). The PWE is a relatively simple formula. Its only inputs are the
number of points scored and the number of points allowed. Though it was introduced to
analyze baseball, it has since been adapted to the NFL and other major sports.
The purpose of the PWE is to predict a team's winning percentage for a given
season based on their points scored and points allowed. There has been further research
into improving it, but the original PWE formula has proven to be nearly as accurate as the
best others have come up with (Luo, 2014, p. 1). In that research, there were several
different attempts made to use advanced metrics to improve the PWE formula in an
attempt to improve its predictive accuracy. The PWE average prediction for a team's
wins was 4.22 games off for a 162 game baseball season. The best of the improved
formulas averaged 3.11 games off (Luo, 2014, p. 5). This difference was found to be
statistically significant. However, the difference, about 25%, is not of a magnitude that it
would negate the usefulness of the PWE when a simpler formula is called for. This
supports both the idea that the PWE is not a perfect formula and also the idea that it is
accurate enough to use for this sort of study.
To that point, one potential issue with the PWE formula is that it tends not to
predict teams finishing with records to either extreme (Luo, 2014). Because of the way
the expected winning percentage is calculated, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the
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predictions to be correct for teams that finish with very few wins or losses respectively.
For example, the 2007 New England Patriots set an NFL record for the highest point
differential in one season in the Super Bowl Era. They went undefeated in the regular
season, outscoring their opponents 589-274 (“2007 New England Patriots”, n.d., p. 1).
However, those Patriots would have only been expected to win 13.76 games using the
PWE. To illustrate the other side of the coin, when the Detroit Lions lost every game of
the 2008 season, they were outscored 268-517 (“2008 Detroit Lions”, n.d., p. 1). The
PWE would have projected them to have won 2.78 games that season. As you can see,
teams with very good or very bad records seem to cause the PWE some trouble.
The purpose of using the PWE for this study is to provide a baseline. The PWE
predicts how many games a team won, over a given stretch, based upon their on-field
performance (Luo, 2014). This number will be used as a baseline for how a team
performed in a given season. Once a baseline has been established, the difference
between that baseline and the actual number of wins a team earned can be examined. I
would expect that most teams would end up fairly close to the baseline with their final
win total. That is the idea behind the PWE and it has been shown to be accurate enough
to support that expectation (Luo, 2014). Teams that end up fairly close to the PWE
predicted baseline are not interesting in this context. They represent teams that fit into
the statistical model well and have average luck. Of course, they will still be included in
the data set, but drawing conclusions about luck from them is difficult if not impossible.
Instead of those teams that fall close to their expected win total, it is more
interesting to examine those teams that experienced results that fall towards the extreme
bounds of what we might expect due to variation. While these could be outliers, and due
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to something other than luck, research discussed later indicates a strong tendency for
these teams to regress to the mean which supports the idea that this is likely variation and
luck at work (Barnwell, 2013). Teams that either far exceed or fall far short of the win
total predicted by the PWE may represent those who either have exceptional luck, good
or bad, or those that do not fit the statistical model well for one reason or another
(Barnwell, 2013). I am interested here in the luck aspect. Later, I will discuss some of
the evidence that these outliers may have luck to blame, but for now the possibility that it
could be luck and the role that the PWE plays in determining that is enough.
This is not the first time that the PWE has been used to judge how lucky a team
was over the course of a season. A simple internet search turns up analysis of how luck
has effected Nebraska football over the years (Vogel, 2012) and which Big 10 football
teams had the best luck (Vint, 2011). These articles are, generally, basic analysis
presented for average fans. However, with PWE being consistently used as a way to tell
how lucky a team was, it begs the question as to why. That is an easy question to answer
if the PWE accurately predicts what a team's winning percentage should have been over a
number of games. If the PWE gives us a decent idea of what a team's win-loss record
might have been, we can measure the difference between that and their actual win-loss
record to determine if the sample was skewed towards more or less wins. Put another
way, whether they had good or bad luck.
While that is a relatively simple determination, it relies on an under-lying
assumption. That the PWE is able to accurately give us that baseline we need to measure
from. Caro and Machtmes (2013) investigated just that. Building on other research that
had investigated what the optimal exponent for the PWE is for each sport, they
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investigated how the PWE fit college football results in an effort to determine if the PWE
is applicable to college football and if it is useful as a retrospective tool. They even posit,
much as I do, that “it could prove to be an effective tool for athletic directors to use when
making coaching decisions” (Caro & Machtmes, 2013, p. 538). Ultimately, Caro and
Machtmes found that the PWE is “an accurate forecasting method for coaches and
athletic directors to use when evaluating the performance of their football programs”
(Caro & Machtmes, 2013, p. 538).
Caro and Machtmes go on to opine about how a coach might use the PWE and the
difference between it and actual winning percentage to draw conclusions about his team
and his own decision making. This is certainly an area that needs further study, but Bill
Barnwell's work, which will be discussed later, suggests that simply waiting for the
sample size to grow might be enough for bad luck to even out (Barnwell, 2013). This
could be one of the most useful aspects of the PWE. If a team can identify when they
have been unlucky, they may be able to avoid overreacting and changing their approach
when it is unnecessary. This is why I use the PWE in this study. I want to find out if
coaches are being fired when the PWE suggests staying the course might result in
performance that a management team would find acceptable.

2.3 Why the NFL?
That the PWE was initially a baseball measure is not surprising. Baseball was the first
sport to see the rise of advanced statistics. Because of its long season and the make-up of
the game, baseball is the most quantifiable sport (Moy, 2006, p. 2). For most studies, this
is an advantage. Every pitch in a baseball game can be recorded. While new research
into defensive metrics, such as range factor, have helped cast new light on other metrics,
14

in general, there can be more useful analysis done on baseball without actually watching
the games than a sport like football (Moy, 2006). Football may be more difficult to
analyze due to its many moving parts. While each play in baseball begins as a battle
between the pitcher and batter, each play in football begins with 11 players on offense
battling 11 players on defense. Trying to identify the goals of each player on any given
play is difficult enough. Trying to analyze how their success or failure impacts the other
battles on the field and, ultimately, the result of the play can be quite difficult. All of this
suggests that baseball is a better venue for research than football (Moy, 2006, p. 2).
However, this study takes a higher level view of on-field performance. Because I am
only interested in a team's winning percentage, their points scored, and their points
allowed, the play by play details are much less important.
If the play by play details of the sport are unimportant, what is important?
Because I am interested in the effect luck may have on a coach being fired, I need to find
a sport where luck has the maximum impact on a season's result. To find such a sport we
must examine what aspects of a data set increase variance. Variance is a measure of the
contribution to error of deviations from the central tendency (Brain & Webb, 1999, p. 2).
I am looking for a sport with high variance because, in the short term, a sport with higher
variance is more influenced by luck. Over the long term, luck will even out and a team's
results will naturally converge on where they should be based on the team's performance
(Barnwell, 2013). In this context, short term and long term refer more to the sample size
than any sort of time measurement. Thus, we are looking for a sport that has the smallest
sample size of outcomes.
The NFL, more so than any other major professional sport in the US, uses a very
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small sample size of outcomes to determine a team's standing in any given year. If a
team over-performs by just 2 wins or under-performs by the same, that team could be
seen much differently than their overall performance would suggest. Preliminary
investigations into such teams suggest that a large differential between wins and wins
predicted by the PWE usually predicts that a team will regress towards the PWE
predicted level the next season (Barnwell, 2013, p. 1).
Barnwell's work is a good example of high level football analytics work being
done on commercial websites, previously on Football Outsiders and now on ESPN.com's
Grantland. Commercial websites present an interesting challenge when operating in an
academic environment. The level of research being done by these websites is respected
by the NFL teams themselves which suggests that it should not be dismissed simply
because it doesn’t come from academia (Vrentas, 2015, p.1). While the work on
commercial sites fails certain tests, it isn't typically peer-reviewed before being published
for instance, the competition that now exists between sites and analysts to provide
analytical services to NFL teams themselves suggests that these sources be taken
seriously. Pro Football Focus is now providing data to 13 NFL teams (Vrentas, 2015, p.
1). The Denver Broncos hired a former STATS LLC employee to lead their work in this
area as a director of football analytics (Swanson, 2015, p. 1). This community of high
level football analysis feeds off of each other’s work and provides a sort of informal peer
review. Bill Barnwell and Brian Burke, in particular, often refer to each other’s work to
support their own ideas (Barnwell, 2013). Between the sites already mentioned, Brian
Burke's site, and Advanced Football Analytics, the work being done is as good as any and
can fill many of the gaps left by traditional academic research in this field.
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Going back to Barnwell's finding that a team's win total will typically regress
towards their PWE predicted total, it fits with the suggestion that the difference between
actual wins and the win total expected by the PWE is, at least in part, due to luck
(Barnwell, 2013). As previously noted, a larger sample size would see outliers regress
towards the type of results their performance deserved. This appears to be exactly what
is happening to teams that have large differentials. This suggests that luck is a factor over
an NFL season. If that is the case, that luck could, potentially, be the difference between
a coach getting fired or retained. If a decision is made before that luck balances out, the
wrong decision could be made.

2.4 Luck
In this study I discuss luck and variance quite a bit. However, there are some in academia
that believe there is no such thing as luck (Hales & Johnson, 2014, p. 520). They believe
that variance always equals out over time and, thus, luck does not exist. However, what
they are really talking about when they say luck does not exist is luck over the long term
with a large sample size (Hales & Johnson, 2014, p. 520). They are refuting the idea that
some people are just luckier than others and will come out ahead even after normal
variance balances out. Because the short term luck is really variance manifesting itself,
they declare that luck does not exist (Hales & Johnson, 2014, p. 520). However, there are
times in sports where a coach, player, or team may not be able to wait out a bad turn that
can be accounted for by variance. I have already discussed the fact that NFL teams can
finish more than 2 wins different than their on-field performance might have been
expected to yield (Barnwell, 2013). While this can go either way, the timing of the swing
could potentially have a great deal of impact on a coach or a franchise.
17

To illustrate an example of how this could come to pass, take the following two
coaches. The first coach has been with his team for many years. He has won a fair
amount of games and been to the play-offs more than once. However, in recent seasons
the team has grown stale and his job is now in jeopardy. In the upcoming season, it is
widely believed that he must reach the play-offs or he will be fired. His team is good and
performs to a level where they should win 10 games. Because of the variation observed,
measured by the PWE and actual wins differential, that team could finish with 8 wins,
miss the play-offs, and the coach could be fired. On the opposite end of the spectrum, the
team could win 12 games and be a high seed in the play-offs which would likely buy the
coach some time with the team (Barnwell, 2013).
The second coach has been with his team for just two years. He took over a team
that was poor, but has improved their win total from 2 in the first year, to 5 in the second
year. This year they perform to a level that should yield them 7 wins (Barnwell, 2013).
After factoring in variation, this team could end up with another 5 win season, which
would be 3 straight well under .500 performances, and show stagnation in development.
This could lead to the coach being fired and, at the very least, it would put him under a
great deal of pressure. On the other hand, they could win 9 games and be on the cusp of
earning a play-off berth (Barnwell, 2013). This would suggest that the coach is
successfully building the team and there would be reason for optimism.
In reality, both teams are likely to win the amount of games that their on-field
performance deserves and the decision on whether or not to retain them would be less cut
and dry (Barnwell, 2013). However, I believe these examples show how different the
narrative could be through no fault of the coach or team. While these coaches both have
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a large enough sample size that their entire body of work should be relatively close to
what their teams have earned, both coaches are at a critical point in their careers where
one season has a great deal of impact. Because one short stretch has such an impact,
variation can also have a great deal of impact. It certainly appears reasonable that this
could happen. This is the luck that I am referring to in this study. It isn't the long term
luck that may not even exist, but the short term variation that occurs at just the wrong
point to have an outsized impact.
It certainly appears that luck has an impact on some team's results over the course
of an NFL season, but this could still be accounted for by problems with the PWE as
opposed to luck. While I previously discussed why I don't think that is the case from the
perspective of the PWE being a good predictor that is difficult to improve upon, it may
also be useful to examine how much luck factors into the NFL from the perspective of
how the actual distribution of win totals compares to a league that was completely based
on luck. Brian Burke of Advanced Football Analytics looked into exactly that (2007).
He found that a league based purely on luck, where every team had exactly a 50% chance
to win each game, would result in a perfect bell curve of team win totals over time. 8
wins would be the most common win total and almost no teams would win all of their
games or none of their games. This was used as the pure luck league because the results
mimicked the results if you flipped a coin to decide the outcome of each game. However,
this would also be the result if the league had perfect parity and each team was exactly as
good as each other team. I know of no reason to believe that is the case so we can
proceed using it as a representation of a pure luck league.
Burke (2007) ended up plotting the actual team win totals along with the expected
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win totals of a purely skill league and putting them all in a graph. From the graph it was
evident that the actual outcomes were a blend of skill and luck. This conclusion was
supported by Burke's chi-square analysis and his further plotting of combinations of luck
and skill in varying combinations such as 10% luck, 90% skill, 20% luck, 80% skill, etc.
At 52.5% luck, his curve became statistically indistinguishable from the actual team win
total curve. This suggests that the outcome of an individual NFL game is decided by luck
52.5% of the time. Considering that the better team would win half of those games, pure
luck being 50/50, it suggests that the better team wins only 74% of the time in the NFL.
Burke's work is a perfect example of the excellent analysis being done on
commercial websites as discussed above. The techniques used to investigate an
important question would be right at home in any academic paper investigating a similar
question. It is difficult to find much lacking in his approach or his thoroughness. Given
that Burke has been formally consulting with NFL teams since 2011 (“About Brian
Burke”, 2015, p. 1) teams at the highest level seem to respect his research as well. This
all would suggest that his work has merit. This suggests that luck has a fairly strong
influence on the outcome of games in the NFL. For our purposes, however, the amount
of effect that luck has is less important than that it does appear to be a significant factor in
the outcome of games.
This suggestion that the outcomes of NFL games are significantly influenced by
luck may explain an issue discussed above with the PWE. Previously it was noted that
the PWE struggles to accurately predict win totals for teams that win almost all of their
games or almost none of them. This could have suggested a weakness in the formula
itself. However, in light of Burke’s (2007) work, it is entirely possible that any NFL team
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that achieves such a record does indeed experience the good or bad luck that the PWE
suggests. If the better team only wins 76% of the time, it would take a great team with
great luck as well to go undefeated (Burke, 2007). The history of great NFL teams that
lost a game or two and the history of terrible teams that managed to win games would
certainly support that idea.
This suggests luck can be a factor both from the PWE side and the win total side
and provides a basis for the study. From this basis, it is reasonable to ask the question, if
luck is a factor in results, how much might it factor in coaches getting fired? I have
previously discussed how team performance is not the only factor in deciding whether a
coach is fired, but it is one of the main factors. If luck has a hand in one of the main
decision making factors, it stands to reason that it would be a factor in the decision itself.
Whether any of the management teams in the NFL are aware of that and accounting for it
is unknown.
As noted above, teams who finish with a high differential between actual wins
and the number of wins the PWE would have predicted are likely to regress towards the
PWE the next season (Barnwell, 2013). There are also other measures that function in a
similar manner. One of those measures may be the ability to win close games (Barnwell,
2014). It has been common wisdom in sports for a long time that some teams simply
perform better under pressure than others (Barnwell, 2014). However, the idea that some
teams are better in close games does not seem to be true when examined with statistical
rigor (Barnwell, 2014). Bill Barnwell, the same writer who provided some of the PWE
analysis referenced above, examined the records of teams in close games and found a
similar regression to the mean for both teams that won a high percentage of their close

21

games, defined as games decided by 7 points or less, in a given season and those who
won a low percentage (2014). While individual teams may avoid this regression for a
season or two, due to an extremely small sample size, when you group these teams
together, the regression is apparent. As groups, both end up very near 50% the next
season. This is a perfect example of variance evening out as the sample size grows. As
noted above, a 16 game regular season does not appear to be a large enough sample size
for variance to reliably even out. When you consider a subset of that season, in this case
close games, variance is even more of a factor. This could explain why some teams have
runs of multiple years where they either win a high percentage or lose a high percentage
of close games. If a team only plays a small number of these games a year, it will take
many years, in some cases, for variance to balance out (Barnwell, 2013). Because
professional sports rosters experience near constant change, by the time this luck
changes, either for the better or worse, the team may look a great deal different. This
may have led to the idea that some teams were better in close games than others, but it
appears not to be the case.
If this is not the case, it is another aspect of professional football that suggests
luck is a significant factor. When I discussed the PWE differential earlier, I mentioned
that the possibility existed that the differential was not due to luck, but due to flaws in the
formula (Luo, 2014). Certain teams could perform in such a way that they are outliers
when measured by the PWE. The suggestion that most of those outliers regress to the
mean the next season casts doubt upon that possibility, but it cannot be completely
dismissed (Barnwell, 2013). This further suggestion, that close games have a similar
regression pattern and teams are unlikely to be significantly better or worse than others in
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close games, casts further doubt on outliers being due to something other than luck
represented by short term variation.
This pattern continues when we take a look at another measure that can predict
success in the NFL, turnover margin. Kevin Rudy conducted an analysis of turnovers,
how they impacted the NFL season, and how many turnovers can be accounted for by
luck (2014). He found that, as expected, turnover differential is a significant factor in
both a team's winning percentage and its scoring differential. While this is to be
expected, it’s important to note given the number of things that used to be conventional
wisdom that don't hold up to statistical tests (Barnwell, 2013). Rudy (2014) continues his
analysis by examining fumbles caused and recovered by a defense. He found that luck
played a huge role in determining both. He went on to test interceptions and again found
that random chance, or luck, played a huge role in determining the number of
interceptions a defense got. In fact, the only aspect of turnover ratio that Rudy found to
be positively correlated from the first half of the season to the second was interceptions
thrown by the offense.
If a team only has control, and only some control at that, of one aspect of the
turnover battle and winning the turnover battle has such a drastic impact on winning, it
again suggests that luck has a real impact on the results of games in the NFL (Rudy,
2014). Rudy’s (2014) study looks at one season only to mitigate the impact of personnel
and coaching changes on the results. It does not account for schedule differences,
however, which could, potentially, be a factor. Regardless, getting these types of results
across the league make it unlikely to be skewed too greatly. This becomes just another
piece of evidence that suggest that luck has a significant impact on the NFL. It looks
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more and more likely that the outliers seen by examining the PWE differential are, in
fact, teams that have experienced extreme luck one way or another be it through turnover
margin, record in close games, or another measure that has yet to be uncovered.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
In order to determine the effect that luck has on coaching retention in the NFL a
model can be built using previously discussed relevant factors, such as PWE, to put
through a binary logistic regression. Using a model where the dependent variable is
equal to 1 if the coach was fired at the end of the season or 0 if he wasn’t should tell us
what the relationship is between luck and coaching retention. It should also inform on
how that relationship compares with other factors. A binary logistic regression can be
used to predict a categorical, dichotomous variable, such as whether or not a head coach
was fired, using a set of predictive variables (Wuensch, 2015, p. 1). By identifying the
major factors that could be used to determine whether or not to fire a head coach and
determining a variable to measure each one, it can be determined which factor is the most
predictive for whether a coach is fired. For the purposes of this thesis, the standard for
significance will be set at .10 (Orzel, 2011).
One binary logistic regression run on the model presented below could be useful
in finding whether luck has an effect on coaching retention in the NFL. However, there
are good and bad luck effects present at the same time in the data set. Because of this, it
may be useful to isolate good luck and bad luck in turn and run a regression of the same
model on each side of luck by itself. After the initial regression, the data set will be split
into two subsets. The first will include only bad luck teams or, stated another way, teams
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who won fewer games than the PWE predicted they should. The second will include
only good luck teams which are teams who won more games than the PWE predicted
they should. The same model will then be run against each subset and the results
presented. This should give some idea as to whether one side of luck, good or bad, is
more powerful than the other. Combined with the original regression, there should be a
clear picture of what, if any, effect luck has on coaching retention in the NFL and how
that could be used to make better decisions when deciding to retain a coach or not.

3.1 Building the model
Having established that the PWE appears to be a good measure of the number of
wins a team's performance should merit, given average luck, and that the difference
between the PWE and a team's actual winning percentage should represent the luck
experienced by a team in a given year, it should now be possible to build a formula
around that idea and test its merits. To test how much luck factors in to whether a coach
gets fired or not, we must test as many factors that could influence the decision as
possible. Including as many as possible will allow comparisons between each factor and
make it clear whether luck has a significant effect.
In order to test multiple factors and how much they effect whether or not a coach
is fired, I will use binary logistic regression. Whether the coach was fired or not will be
the binary dependent variable and each of the factors that may have an influence on that
decision will be independent variables. This is a good fit for the question at hand.
Because a logistic regression allows for the examination of the influence of various
factors in a dichotomous outcome, it should provide a strong indication of whether luck is
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having an effect (Anderson, n. d., p. 1). In order to do that, however, it is imperative that
the proper factors are included in the analysis and that their representative variables
measure those factors in the right way to answer this question. In order to build the
formula in that way, each factor that is to be included must first be considered.
The first factor that I want to include is one of the most basic. At the highest
levels of sport, winning games is the ultimate measure of performance. If a coach is
measured by his team's results on the field, I would expect the team's winning percentage
to have a strong effect on whether the coach is fired or not. Because the PWE formula
results in an expected winning percentage, my formula will use a team's winning
percentage to represent their actual results on the field for a given year.
The next factor to consider is the PWE. As previously discussed, the PWE is a
measure of predicted wins based on a team's performance on the field had their luck been
neutral. In this way, the PWE is a measure of a team's on field performance, as opposed
to the traditional win percentage which is a measure of results. The difference between
performance and results is, ultimately, the basis for this study.
As noted above, what is most interesting here is the luck factor which is, at its
core, measured by the difference between the actual winning percentage and the PWE
predicted winning percentage. Therefore, the model constructed here contains the
difference between the PWE and the actual win percentage of a team for a given season,
labeled as “Diff16” in all tables. This puts a measure of luck directly into the model. In
order to make the results of the logistic regression simpler to interpret, the variable
representing the difference between the two will be multiplied by sixteen. This will give
us the luck variable in the number of wins it represents rather than a decimal number
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representing the winning percentage. This will make the findings of how much a one unit
change effects whether a coach is fired more easily digestible.
While winning percentage and the PWE give us measures of success for a team,
neither feature a set standard for what is or is not a successful season. It is left to each
franchise to determine how many wins is enough in a given year. However, the NFL
does feature a line of demarcation each year between successful teams and unsuccessful
teams. The champions of each division, along with the two best records among the rest
of the teams in each conference, make the play-offs. This can act as a sort of default
measure of success for a franchise. This is not a perfect measure as the top twelve teams
by record don't always make the play-offs, but making that field and having a chance to
win a title may have an impact on whether or not a coach keeps his job. Therefore, the
model needs to include it. Because this measure is being used as a demarcation line
between success and failure, it makes sense to use a binary variable, labeled as
“Play_Offs” in all tables. While some attempt could be made to account for additional
success or failure in the play-offs, that would be beyond the scope of this particular
variable and model.
The next potential factor in the decision to change coaches that I will include in
this model is the tenure of the current head coach. In the discussion above, it was found
that some studies suggested changing coaches made things worse while in other studies it
was found that changing coaches was the right decision for teams that were not
performing. While the conflicting findings will not be settled here, it does suggest that
tenure is at least worth investigating as having an effect on the coaching change decision.
Adding to that the potential for a long tenured coach to have more political power than a
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shorter tenured one and the possibility exists that tenure is a significant factor. Measuring
tenure for this study is relatively simple. For this model, the variable measures the
number of years the current head coach has been at his current post, labeled as “Tenure”
in all tables. For first year head coaches, the variable value will be a one. Each year the
coach is retained, the value will increase by one.
The number of years a head coach has held the position is a simple way to address
tenure, but there are a number of other related factors beyond that which may be
informative as to why a coach was fired or retained. For instance, the tenure variable
used here does not address the remaining years of a coach’s contract or the financial
implications of firing him at a certain time. Firing a coach whose contract is up at the
end of the season is much more palatable than one who has many years left and would be
paid a great deal of money if not retained. Beyond such quantitative factors, political
factors, as previously discussed, can have a significant impact on the decision. If a coach
has a strained relationship with management, he is more likely to be fired. All of these
things work in concert with other factors discussed here to inform the final outcome.
However, it is difficult to gather accurate information for some of these factors, such as
coaching contract details and others are far too subjective to include, such as the
relationship between the coach and management. Because of that, the simple tenure
variable will be used here. Further studies could be conducted to investigate additional
factors.
The last aspect of the decision making process that must be addressed in this
model is the expectations of the franchise. As noted above, success for an NFL team is
not a uniform measure. Some teams start the year simply hoping to be competitive, gain
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experience, and build towards the future. Others start the year feeling that anything short
of a Super Bowl victory will be a failure. This can make judging what gets a coach fired
quite difficult. In order to mitigate the effect the varying expectations might have on the
model, the model must make an effort to measure what those expectations are likely to
be. While it is impossible to know for sure what management expects from their team in
a given year, there are two things that may give us a good idea.
The first is how the team has performed in prior seasons. This is important for a
couple of reasons. The short term history of a team may give a good indication of where
the team is from a talent and development stand point. Teams that have won a lot in the
last two to three seasons might expect more than those who have been suffering through
losing campaigns. Taking a longer view, franchises who have won a lot in the last five to
ten years, or even longer, may tend to have higher expectations than those who are,
traditionally, near the bottom of the league. Holmes (2011) investigated this theory on
college football coaches and found it to be true. His findings are informative as to how to
structure the measure we use to represent expectations in the model. He used win
percentages from one year ago, two years ago, three to ten years ago, and eleven to thirty
years ago. The three to ten years ago average was the strongest predictor of the group.
The variables for last season and two seasons ago had some predictive strength,
especially last season, but individually they just aren't strong enough.
For my model, I'd like to avoid having several different measures of past win
percentage. For one, I'd like to group those that have an effect together so they are as
strong and accurate as possible. For another, adding multiple win percentage variables
from a similar time period may cause issues of collinearity. While they would not be
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directly related, winning teams in the NFL may tend to keep winning, while losing teams
may tend to keep losing. I'd prefer to avoid those issues all together and identify one
time period to use. To that end, Holmes would suggest factoring in the last ten seasons.
However, there are some fundamental differences between the NFL and college football
that make that a questionable decision. As previously mentioned, the salary cap and rule
structure of the NFL encourages parity. This is in stark contrast to college football where
some schools pour much greater resources into their programs than others. This could
lead to much quicker changes in fortune in the NFL. Because of this, the history that is
applicable to expectation levels may be less. For this reason, I will be using the past five
seasons win percentage to measure expectations, labeled as “Last5” in all models. As
with the differential variable, converting the win percentage to the number of wins per
season it represents will give us more easily digestible output so the percentage will be
multiplied by sixteen.
The other factor that may give us insight into what the expectations may have
been for a given team is what sort of trend their winning percentage had seen in the past
five seasons. This may help to address some of the problems that averaging out winning
percentages over several years could have. For example, if the model only used the past
five seasons winning percentage, the following two teams would look exactly the same.
Team 1 won 10, 8, 3, 4, and 6 games over the last 5 years. Their coach got fired after the
3 win season and the new coach has increased their win total each of his first two
seasons. Team 2 won 3, 4, 6, 8, and 10 games. Their coach has been in place for all five
of those seasons and finally got them into the play-offs last season. Team 1’s
expectations are likely lower than team 2’s. While team 1 is likely looking for another
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increase in their win total and maybe a play-off berth, team 2 is likely looking to win
their division and contend for a Super Bowl spot. Without identifying the trend, it would
be impossible to tell the difference between the two.
In order to measure the trend, the model will simply use a value that reflects how
many seasons in a row a team’s winning percentage has moved in the same direction,
labeled as “Trend” in all models. Positive values will be used for teams with a rising win
percentage and negative values will be used for those who have falling win percentages.
Because we are using five seasons of history for the winning percentage piece of
expectations, the trend will only reflect the past five seasons as well. The same reasons
given above as to why history beyond five years is unlikely to have much impact apply.
This variable will only reflect the current active streak for a given team. If they have
improved their win totals for the last 3 seasons they will have a 3 for this variable. If they
have lost more games during the last 2 seasons, they will receive a -2.
Table 1. Model Variables
Name
Diff 16

Last5
Tenure
Play_Offs

Trend

Definition
The difference between the
PWE expected winning % and
the actual winning percentage
multiplied by 16.
The average of the last 5
seasons winning percentage.
The number of years the head
coach has been in his current
position.
Whether or not a team made
the play-offs for that season.
How many years in a row a
team has won (or lost) more
games than the previous
season. Only the current
active streak is included.
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Relationship
Negative

?
?
Negative

?

Table 1 identifies the variables that will be used to measure the factors identified
above and declares what, if any, relationship is expected between the variables and
whether a coach is fired. I expect that Diff16, the variable used to measure luck, and
Play_Offs, whether or not a team made the play-offs, will have a negative relationship
while the others could go either way. This is simply due to good luck and making the
play-offs both indicating that a team had a better season than those that had bad luck or
didn’t make the play-offs. Better performance on the field should lead to less firings.
Less clear is the relationship with Last5, the average of the last 5 season’s
winning percentages, Tenure, the number of years a coach has been in his current
position, and Trend, which is the number of years in a row a teams win total has moved in
the same direction. Each of these variables has forces pushing them in different
directions. Because of that, they may be positive or negative relationships with the
dependent variable.
The model defined above is as follows:

(Coaching Retention) = a + b1(Diff16) + b2(Last5) + b3(Tenure) + b4(Play_Offs) + b5(Trend)

In this model, coaching retention, or whether a coach is fired or not after a given season,
will be predicted by Diff16, Last5, Tenure, Play_Offs and Trend. The coefficients for
each variable should give some clue as to the relative predictive power of each factor in
the given formula.
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3.2 The data set
The model that has been identified to this point should do a good job of telling us
if luck is a significant factor in whether or not a coach gets fired in the NFL. In order to
answer that question, a good data set must be identified to run the model against. With
all of the variables previously identified, gathering the data was relatively easy. Deciding
on a sample size and parsing through a couple of issues inherent in the data set was
slightly more difficult. As for sample size, as previously discussed, the NFL is a rapidly
evolving league so historical trends that date back too far may not be especially
informative. On the other hand, this sort of analysis lends itself to a longer time frame
than information that may be used in deciding to fire a coach. Weighing those two
factors, using the last 20 seasons, starting with 1994 and ending with 2013 seems to be a
good balance. At the time of compilation, the data set was only complete through 2013
which is why 2014 was omitted.
The data set was compiled using Pro-Football-Reference.com. In addition to the
basic information required to compute the variables included in the model, there were
some adjustments to be made that required interpretation of certain situations. The first
such situation was how to handle coaches who retired or otherwise left teams without
being fired. Because the aim here is to examine the decision on whether or not to fire a
coach, the only coaching changes that are relevant are those where a management team
decided to go in another direction. For that reason, the data set reflects a 1 for the
coaching change variable only whether a coach was fired or not with all other outcomes,
such as returning the next season or retiring, being a 0. This requires some judgments to
be made. It is sometimes difficult to determine when a coach is fired and when he has

33

chosen to walk away. Especially in cases where the coach leaves to take another
coaching job, it can be difficult to determine if he left to avoid being fired. Every effort
was made to determine what most likely happened in any given situation, but the
determinations made here are not infallible.
The second situation was what to do with teams that didn't have five years of
history to fill the average winning percentage aspect of the expectations factor. This
applied to expansion teams such as Jacksonville and Carolina, but also to the new version
of the Cleveland Browns. For teams that moved, the franchise simply continued in a new
location so the data continued on as if nothing had happened. For Cleveland, their
franchise moved to Baltimore and continued there so the expansion team they were
awarded was a new start. While there are a number of ways to deal with missing data, as
there would have been for these teams until they built enough history, it was ultimately
decided to remove them from the data set. The potential that expansion teams may
operate a bit differently from other, more established, franchises cannot be discounted.
Trying to measure them as you would an established franchise may introduce problems.
For that reason, it seemed safer to remove their first five years from the data set. The
sample size is still plenty large enough without those seasons. With those issues
resolved, the remaining data set has 610 cases. Running a binary logistic regression with
the identified model on those 610 cases will identify if luck is a factor in whether or not a
head coach is fired in the NFL.
The data set includes all cases, but it is useful to run the same model with only
good luck cases and only bad luck cases each in turn in order to isolate the two. After
running the model on the entire data set and examining the results, the same model will
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be run on only the good luck cases and then only the bad luck cases in order to see if one
direction of luck is stronger than the other. This may give us insight into whether bad or
good luck is more predictive of coaching retention which could shed some light on just
what management teams are doing now and might need to look out for in the future.
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS
With the model and methodology defined, it is useful to look at some descriptive
statistics for the data set before proceeding to the three regressions described above. Of
particular interest here is what causes a head coach in the NFL to get fired. If that can be
understood, it may be of use when looking at the results of each regression and answering
the question of what, if any, effect luck may have on head coach retention in the NFL.

4.1 Data set analysis
Table 2. Dependent Variable Frequency
Value

Frequency

Percent

0

477

78.20%

1

133

21.80%

Of the 610 cases in the data set, the coach was fired 133 times or 21.8% of the
time. This amounts to a little more than 6 coaches fired each NFL season. 78.2% of the
data set is made of up of cases where the coach was not fired.
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics – Variables
Mean 0 Std Dev 0 Mean 1 Std Dev 1
Tenure

3.828

3.113

4.15

2.781

Wins

8.665

2.795

5.684

2.645

Diff16

0.183

1.205

-0.483

1.224

Avg Wins – Last 5

8.103

1.935

7.621

1.872

36

The average tenure of a coach that was fired, represented by Mean 1 in table 3,
was slightly higher than the average tenure of coaches who were not fired, Mean 0 in
table 3. Only 13 of 135 first year head coaches were fired, which is a little less than 10%.
That rises to 27 of 120 in the second year which, at 22.5%, is higher than the overall
average. The number of wins is substantially higher for coaches that were not fired
compared to coaches who were. Also, the average luck of coaches who were fired was
much worse than those who were fired. Coaches who were fired averaged almost half a
win less than the PWE predicted. Finally, the average number of wins over the last five
seasons is higher for coaches who were not fired, but by less than half a win per season
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics - Cases
# of Cases Coach Fired

%

Made Play-Offs

235

14

5.96%

Win Total Trending Up

276

62

22.5%

Last 5 Yrs Avging 10+ Wins

104

17

16.3%

Making the play-offs substantially decreases the odds that a coach is fired after a
given season, dropping the chances to less than 6%. Having a win total trending up
compared to previous seasons does not appear to have much, if any, effect. The overall
look at any positive trend actually has a higher incidence of coaches getting fired than the
entire data set does. A closer look shows that only a two-year trend in a positive
direction, meaning that a team won more games last year than they did the year before,
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then won more games this year than they did last year, has a lower incidence of firings
than the overall average. Even then, approximately 17% of coaches are fired. The win
total trend doesn’t seem to be a good measure.
Consistently winning games, defined in this case as averaging 10 wins or more
over the past five seasons, only drops the chances of a coach getting fired to 16.3%. This
seems in line with the above finding that the average number of wins over the past 5
years is not much higher for coaches who are not fired as compared to those who are. It
is a factor, but far less important than current year performance.
One of the most significant findings here is that the average bad luck team loses
more than half a game, on average, more than the average good luck team. This strongly
suggests that luck is a significant factor in whether or not a coach is fired. However,
more than one piece of evidence is necessary to build a strong case. Investigating the
findings of the regressions could now provide additional evidence or refute this finding.

4.2 Regression of the model
The first regression run was the constructed model against the entire data set,
including all cases, both good and bad luck. The goal here was to address one of the
overall goals of this thesis which is to determine how much, if any, effect the impact of
luck has on the retention of NFL head coaches. This regression should help to further
answer the question of how much, if any, effect the impact of luck has here.
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Table 5. Regression Results – Model
Diff16
Last5
Tenure
Play_Offs
Trend
Constant

B
-.30
-.15
.13
-1.76
.00
-.19

S.E.
.09
.06
.04
.32
.08
.44

Sig.
.001
.016
.001
.000
.981
.675

Table 6. Dependent Variable Frequency
Value

Frequency

Percent

0

477

78.20%

1

133

21.80%

Table 7. Overall Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Tenure
Last5
Trend
Diff16

N
610
610
610
610

Mean
3.90
.50
-.04
.04

Std Dev
3.04
.12
1.36
1.24

Min
1.00
.19
-4.00
-3.32

Max
16.00
.83
4.00
3.76

After performing a binary logistic regression, where the dependent variable was a
1 if the coach was fired after the season and a 0 if not, the model constructed above was
found to have a Nagelkerke R squared of .20. This means that 20% of the variation is
explained by the model. While this is not overly high, it is far enough above zero to
indicate that the model may have predictive value (“FAQ: What are pseudo Rsquareds?”). Given the number of factors that go into the decision to fire a coach in the
NFL, and the number of those factors that cannot be quantified, it should not be overly
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surprising that the r square measure is a little low. This should not mean the entire model
is discounted.
This regression finds luck, as represented by the Diff16 variable to be a
significant factor and the second strongest predictive variable to Play_Offs, which was
also found to be significant. Both of those variables had a negative relationship with the
dependent variable. Coaches that make the play-offs being less likely to be fired is
precisely what was expected. That being confirmed here in a model where it is suggested
that better luck also makes a coach less likely to be fired further builds the case that luck
is a real factor here. It was expected that Diff16 would have a negative relationship and it
does.
The Last5 variable was also found to be significant and have a negative
relationship with the dependent variable, though it was less predictive than Diff16 and
Play_Offs. This suggests that the rise in expectations for a team that has been winning
outweighs the good will engendered towards the head coach by past victories. The
variable for tenure was found to be significant and had a positive relationship with the
dependent variable. This suggests that coaches are more likely to get fired the longer
they spend in a given position. Finally, the trend variable was not close to significant. It
appears that it is either not a factor or a better measure needs to be constructed.
This initial regression again points to luck being a real factor in whether a coach
is fired or not. It is important to note that the minimum, -3.32, and maximum, 3.76,
values found for the Diff16 variable represent a difference of over 7 wins. This is a
substantial finding suggesting that luck has a powerful effect on the final outcome for a
coach. While the minimum and maximum values are relatively close in their absolute
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values, it is possible that good luck or bad luck is more predictive than the other. In order
to test for that, the two opposing luck forces must be isolated and regressions run against
the isolated data.

4.3 Regression to isolate bad luck
In order to isolate bad luck from good, the next regression will be run using the
same model, but against a data set that contains only those original cases where the
Diff16 variable was negative. This should provide insight into the power of bad luck and,
when compared to good luck and the overall regression, may be informative as to
whether it is more, less or equally as powerful.
Table 8. Regression Results – isolated for bad luck
B
-.31
-.15
.14
-2.05
-.06
-.24

Diff16
Last5
Tenure
Play_Offs
Trend
Constant

S.E.
.18
.08
.05
.55
.10
.60

Sig.
.087
.060
.006
.000
.566
.684

Table 9. Dependent Variable Frequency
Value

Frequency

Percent

0

205

69.97%

1

88

30.03%
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Table 10. Bad Luck Regression Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Tenure
Last5
Trend
Diff16

N
293
293
293
293

Mean
3.70
.50
-.07
-1.01

Std Dev
3.03
.12
1.34
.73

Min
1.00
.21
-3.00
-3.32

Max
16.00
.80
4.00
.00

The results of the regression to isolate bad luck look remarkably similar to the
original model with one major difference. The Nagelkerke R squared is .16 which is
slightly less than the full regression. The coefficients and odd-ratios for the variables are
similar to what was found in the previous regression. Diff16, Play_Offs and Last5
remained significant with negative relationships while Tenure was significant and had a
negative relationship. Trend was still found to be insignificant.
That the coefficients, significance and relationships did not change much, if at all,
suggests that bad luck has a similar effect as luck overall. The magnitude of that effect
also appears to be similar and it does not appear that any of the factors in the model are
substantially more or less sensitive to bad luck than luck overall. This makes it likely
that good and bad luck have similar powers, but the model will be run again, isolating
good luck this time, to be sure.

4.4 Regression to isolate good luck
In order to compare the power of good luck to that of bad luck, the same
regression, using the original model and, this time, using a data set with only good luck
cases, was run. Comparing the results of the two should be informative as to the relative
power of the two opposing directions of luck.
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Table 11. Regression results – isolated for good luck
B
-.29
-.17
.12
-1.60
.09
-.10

Diff16
Last5
Tenure
Play_Offs
Trend
Constant

S.E.
.27
.11
.06
.40
.12
.74

Sig.
.286
.116
.057
.000
.477
.893

Table 12. Dependent Variable Frequency
Value

Frequency

Percent

0

272

85.80%

1

45

14.20%

Table 13. Good Luck Regression Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Tenure
Last5
Trend
Diff16

N
317
317
317
317

Mean
4.09
.50
-.01
1.00

Std Dev
3.05
.12
1.38
.72

Min
1.00
.19
-4.00
.00

Max
15.00
.83
3.00
3.76

As with the regression isolating bad luck, the results here are similar to what was
previously found. The Nagelkerke R squared is .16 which is identical to the bad luck
regression. The odds ratio for the differential variable here is slightly higher than the first
two regressions. While this does line up with an ever so slight difference in effect, bad
luck being slightly stronger than the overall, good luck being slightly weaker, it isn't
nearly definitive enough to draw conclusions from. That Diff16, Play_Offs and Last5
continue to be significant with a negative relationship and similar coefficients further
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suggests that the two sides of luck are very close to the same in predictive power. Tenure
and Trend were also found with the same significance, relationship and similar
coefficients. All three regressions generate similar enough output that it suggests good
and bad luck have similarly powerful effects.
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION
This research set out to meet two objectives. The first, to gain an understanding
of the impact of luck on an NFL team’s outcomes during a given season. The second, to
determine how much, if any, effect the impact of luck has on NFL head coach’s retention.
After reviewing other research, it became clear that luck has a real impact on the
outcomes of individual games in an NFL season (Burke, 2013). There are some
statistical measures, such as record in close games and turnover margin (Barnwell, 2013),
that can help identify when a team may have been lucky or unlucky over a period of time,
but they lack the ability to specifically quantify the end result of luck on a team’s record.
To get to that specific measure, the Pythagorean Win Expectation was used to
establish a baseline (Luo, 2014) of what a team’s record should have been with neutral
luck. The difference between a team’s actual record and the PWE predicted record was
then found and used as a measure of the effect of luck in a given season. This quantified
the impact of luck on an NFL team’s outcomes during a given season.
With that objective achieved, it was on to determining how much, if any, effect
the impact of luck has on NFL head coach’s retention. A model was built with variables
accounting for luck, tenure, recent performance, whether a team made the play-offs and
whether a team was trending towards winning more games or less over previous years.
This model was then put through a binary logistic regression in order to investigate the
impact of luck on NFL head coach’s retention. The results indicate that luck is a
significant factor in deciding whether or not a head coach in the NFL is fired or retained.
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5.1 Data set analysis discussion
Before further discussing how luck is a factor in whether a coach gets fired, it is
important to understand why coaches get fired. Taking a deeper look at the data set used
for this study can help with that aspect. The understanding that just over 20% of cases in
the data set represent seasons that ended with a head coach getting fired gives some idea
of the magnitude of the situation and the likelihood that this will happen. While most
head coaches will retain their job each year, having approximately one in five turn over
each season suggests that most won’t survive for too long.
The difference between coaches who get fired and those that do not are sometimes
subtle and sometimes obvious. The average tenure of the two groups is fairly close, but
those that get fired tend to have slightly more years at their current job. That is largely
explained by coaches in their first year being less than half as likely to be fired when
compared to all other coaches. There seems to be little protection after the first year.
One thing that does seem to protect coaches, no matter what their tenure is winning
games this season.
Coaches who did not get fired averaged almost three more wins over the current
year than their fired counterparts. This, combined with the finding that coaches who
made the play-offs were fired less than 6% of the time suggests that current year
performance is the most important thing. This also supports the idea that luck is a
substantial factor as luck directly effects the number of wins a team achieves in a given
season and, in certain situations, could decide whether or not a team makes the play-offs.
Coaches who are fired average almost half a win less than their PWE while coaches who
are retained average almost two-tenths of a win more than theirs. This is an important
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finding because it directly suggests that coaches who are retained are luckier than those
who are fired. The luck factor does not account for the entire difference between the
number of wins each group achieved, but it does account for some of it.
Current year success appears to be important, but success in the recent past seems
less so. The difference between the average number of wins over the last five seasons for
the group of coaches that was retained was a little less than half a win per season more
than those who were fired. While there is a difference, it is much closer than the
difference in current year wins. This may, again, be the conflicting forces of wins in
previous seasons building up good will towards the coach, but also building up
expectations that must be met. Regardless of why it is, the effect is clear. Winning in
previous years is good, but if a coach doesn’t get the job done in the current season, he
may not get another chance.
Despite the suggestion that winning this year is the most important thing, there are
some suggestions that it isn’t the only thing having an effect. The fact that some coaches
get fired even after making the play-offs and get fired even after averaging 10 or more
wins over the past 5 seasons suggests that even winning won’t always save a coach’s job.
As previously discussed, inflated expectations or power struggles in the front office could
factor in here (Breer, 2013), but it is difficult to know exactly why each decision is made.
The most important finding to note from the data set is the substantial difference between
the luck of coaches who are retained and those who are not. This further suggests that
luck plays a substantial role in the final decision.

47

5.2 Initial regression discussion
Analyzing the data set again suggests that luck is a substantial factor here. If that
is true it should be evident in the regression results as well and it is. A 26% reduction in
the likelihood of getting fired for a one unit increase in the Diff16 variable, in this case
that would be one additional win over a season, is significant. Of the 610 records in the
data set, 60 of those finished a season more than 2 wins higher or lower than the PWE
would have predicted. This is almost 10% of the data set which is equivalent to about 3
teams per season. For these teams, luck could have a serious impact on whether or not a
coach is retained. The effect may be more subtle for the rest of the league, but it may still
sway the final decision under the right circumstances.
The variable for the average number of wins in the past five seasons indicates that
more wins over recent seasons makes a coach less likely to be fired. This is at odds with
the suggestion that more wins result in higher expectations which, in turn, results in a
coach being more likely to be fired. Instead, it would appear that the power of a better
recent track record outweighs any raised expectations from management. This could
indicate that coaches can earn some goodwill with prior good performance that can
overcome a bad season. As discussed above, there are a number of other factors involved
with tenure that could also be influencing this finding. More research is necessary to
evaluate which factors have the most influence. The tenure factor is less powerful than
luck, however. This could be due to the conflicting powers at work with this variable, but
it also could indicate that luck is a significant factor in the overall decision making
process.
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The tenure variable finds that a coach is more likely, on average, to be fired as his
tenure advances. This seems to be at odds with conventional wisdom that a coach
becomes more secure the longer he stays with a team, but this could be, again, the result
of conflicting powers at work in this variable. The powers, in this case, would be the
initial grace period that many new coaches get before they are likely to be fired against
the job security that a long tenured coach may have. . If most coaches get a three year
grace period, they would be much more likely to be fired after their third, fourth, or fifth
season than their first or their second. If there are a lot more of these coaches than those
who stay at their jobs long term, which seems plausible on the surface, you could have a
case where gaining tenure would be detrimental to your chances of keeping your job.
More research could be done here in future studies, but structuring the tenure variable to
distinguish between those early in their tenures as head coach, and thus potentially
enjoying a grace period, and those who were well past any grace periods may be
informative.
The variable indicating whether a team made the play-offs was the strongest
predictor in the model. An 83% reduction in the chance a coach will get fired is
significant, if not overly surprising. This holds with conventional wisdom that making
the play-offs is seen as success for most NFL head coaches. Considering that good luck
will raise a team's win total and raise its chances of getting into the play-offs, the effect of
luck may have some impact on the play-offs being such a strong predictor.
Overall, analyzing this model seems to suggest that luck has a real impact on
whether or not a coach gets fired. However, it does not distinguish between good and
bad luck. It could be the case that the luck effect on the head coaching question is more
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pronounced one way or the other. Put another way, bad luck could be more likely to get
you fired than good luck is to save your job or vice versa. This is easily testable with a
slight adjustment to the data set. To isolate bad luck and good luck respectively, two
further regressions will be run. The first will be run using only cases with a differential
of less than zero. This will isolate the effect of bad luck. The other regression will be run
using only cases with differentials greater than zero. This will isolate the effect of good
luck. Comparing the results should reveal if one is much more predictive than the other.

5.3 Discussion of luck regressions
Good and bad luck being equally strong predictors of a coach getting fired
makes sense. If the effect seen here is luck, it should be just as likely that a coach on the
brink of being fired gets lucky and wins a couple extra games to save his job as it would
be for him to get unlucky and lose a couple extra games to lose his job. The overall
statistics of the data set bear that out. From the 610 cases in the data set, 317 had good
luck while 293 had bad luck. The good luck teams won 58% of their games while the
bad luck teams won 42% of theirs. However, when you adjust for luck and look strictly
at performance, as measured by the PWE, the two groups look much closer. The good
luck teams’ performance should have earned them the win in 51.7% of their games with
neutral luck. The bad luck teams should have earned wins in 47.8% of theirs. This
difference of less than 4% is less than one additional victory per 16 game season.
Table 14. Good and bad luck teams
Good Luck
Bad Luck

# of Cases
317
293

Win %
58%
42%
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PWE
51.7%
47.8%

This finding suggests that winning teams and losing teams both have about the
same likelihood of suffering bad luck or experiencing good luck. As discussed above, the
PWE is not a perfect formula and, even if it were, the difference between the PWE and a
team’s actual winning percentage may not be completely explained by luck. If teams that
had a high number of wins were more likely to be judged as lucky, it would cast doubt as
to whether the effect were truly luck as opposed to a manifestation of something else. In
this case, with good and bad luck having similar PWEs, it seems that the majority of the
effect could be due to luck.
This difference, in addition to the previous findings that the differential was a
significant factor and that good and bad luck are equally predictive, suggests, again, that
luck has a real effect on the decision making process. At this point, a good case has been
made that luck has something to do with whether a coach gets fired.

5.4 Further Research
There are a number of aspects of the differential variable used here that could
be investigated further. The baseline itself, the PWE, may not be as accurate as it could
be. Because that formula counts points scored for or against in any game situation as
being of the same value, teams are rewarded for running up the score in wins or making
potential blow-out losses close after the other team has put in their reserves. Neither of
these things is necessarily indicative of how good a team is, but the current formula
skews towards teams that take these routes. Further investigation into a formula that
weights points scored based on the game situation could be useful to finding a more
accurate baseline from which to start. In addition, there could be additional metrics,
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beyond points scored for and against, that could be useful in building a better baseline.
This could also use further investigation.
The potential for certain teams to consistently show as lucky or unlucky is
something else that should be acknowledged and could be the basis for further research.
A better baseline may address this to some extent, but there could be some teams which
simply perform in such a way that they will always seem to be experiencing more good
or bad luck than they should. These teams should be identified and then studied to find
out why they don’t fit into the current formula well. This could be useful in improving
the formula and in the decision making process. Understanding when the differential is a
factor of luck and when it may not be is crucial to knowing when to use it to inform your
decision.
Also, more research needs to be done to find out how much the performance of a
head coach and his team is a factor in the coach keeping his job. As previously
discussed, there are many factors outside of wins and losses that influence a management
team’s decision. Finding out just how influential these factors might be could be
informative into deciding how much a change in wins and losses matters overall. If the
model with wins used here only explains 28% of variance, then 72% is still unaccounted
for. While that is unlikely to be all factors outside of on field performance, those factors
could still be a significant influence.
Finally, investigation into whether a sports management team that knew and
understood the influence of luck would significantly change their decision making
process needs to be done. While it seems that an 8 win team that should have won 10
games but was unlucky would be judged differently than an 8 win team that should have
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won 6 games but was lucky, that may not always be the case. While that knowledge
informs the management team about on field performance, it may not change the
perceptions of fans and sponsors. Whether those perceptions could be shifted by
publicizing this sort of data is difficult to know. The debate over how useful advanced
metrics are continues in the sports world at this time. There are factions of fans on either
side of the debate and the sponsors would no doubt be greatly affected by the reaction of
those fans.

5.5 Thinking outside the norm
As previously mentioned, any thinking outside the norm is, at once, a potential
breakthrough and a potential disaster. While the potential to gain an edge over the
competition is tempting, the potential to alienate fans and lose sponsors is chilling. As
time goes on, thinking that was, in the past, outside the norm may become more accepted.
While this makes it much easier to implement such thinking, it also eliminates much of
the edge to be gained over the competition. In the end, the amount of risk an organization
is willing to take in this area is directly proportional to the potential gain they could
receive if it pans out. It may take a franchise with little to lose to gamble on a risky,
cutting edge philosophy and succeed in order to introduce it into the main stream.

5.6 Conclusion
The research objective to gain an understanding of the impact of luck on an NFL
team’s outcomes during a given season has been well addressed by other sources. The
work of Brian Burke (2013) and Bill Barnwell (2013) in particular made clear that chance
has a real impact on winning games in the NFL. What was less clear is just how much
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impact that could have on a given team’s record. Using the PWE as a baseline, the luck
effect for each team and season was quantified and evaluated. The difference between
the luckiest team, +3.7 wins, and the unluckiest, -3.3 wins, was substantial. Any factor
that could account for a 7 win difference over a 16 game season should be taken
seriously.
With that objective achieved, the investigation to determine how much, if any,
effect the impact of luck has on NFL head coach’s retention could begin. The model to
be used for binary logistic regression was built and regressions were run against the entire
data set, only those cases indicating good luck and only those cases indicating bad luck.
The results again indicated that luck was a significant factor and that both sides of it,
good and bad, were similar in their predictive power. That a one unit increase in the luck
variable was found to reduce the chances of a coach being fired by 26% is notable.
Luck alone is, ultimately, a significant and substantial factor in determining
whether or not a coach gets fired. Analysis of the data set clearly points to luck playing a
substantial role. The regressions run here indicate that luck is second only to whether or
not a team made the play-offs in predictive power. Because luck impacts the number of
games won, it can also impact whether a team makes the play-offs. However, there is
quite a bit of variation that is not explained. This is most likely due to the previously
discussed idea that the decision to make a coaching change is an extremely complex and
nuanced one. There are many factors involved that are not quantifiable and those that are
may be judged differently depending on the organization.
It is possible that the league as a whole is failing to account for luck when
evaluating a coach’s performance or, at least, not accounting for it as much as they
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should. If winning games in the current year is the best way to keep from getting fired,
that suggests that management teams are focusing on the number of wins and may not be
considering how that number was reached. If this is indeed the case, there could be an
edge to be gained by NFL organizations in ensuring luck is accounted for during their
decision making process. It may not swing the decision in many cases, but it could be
informative in certain situations. The fact that fired coaches averaged almost half a win
less than the PWE predicted suggests that bad luck is bad for job retention. That could be
interpreted as management teams not taking it into account. However, another possibility
is that management teams well know the impact that luck can have, but cannot act on it
due to outside influences. Sponsors and fans may react to the official standings,
necessitating action on the part of the management team. If a head coach loses the
support of the fans and sponsors, who play a large role in the financial bottom line of the
franchise, he may need to be fired, even if it was caused by bad luck.
Regardless of why luck is a factor in coaches getting fired, it seems clear that it is.
If it is clear that luck plays a part in a team getting to their final win total and that
regression to the mean is likely for teams that are most effected (Barnwell, 2013), then it
is important that sport management teams and everyone involved with sport acknowledge
that and understand the implications. Focusing solely on what the results are, regardless
of whether your hand is forced by sponsors, fans, or others in power, is failing to take
relevant information into account. Failing to take relevant information into account could
result in a poor decision being made and the organization being worse off for it. Luck, as
defined in this study, exists in the NFL and has a direct impact on the biggest factor, wins
in the current year, in deciding whether a coach is retained or fired.
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